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CHAPTER 18
Response to Richards
GABRIEL FINKELSTEIN
i. Introduction
Robert J. Richards has spent most of his career tracing the connections between 
German Romanticism and Charles Darwin. His research has done much to 
change our image of the great Victorian naturalist. Where earlier scholarship 
tended to understand Darwin’s theory in the context of natural theology and 
political economy, both native English traditions, Richards has demonstrated 
the importance of foreign ideas to the creation and reception of Darwin’s 
treatise On the Origin of Species. His essay above is exemplary in this regard.
I won’t presume to challenge Richard’s argument. His brief is a model 
of logic, evidence, and style; he knows a lot more about Darwin than I do; I 
support his interest in directing scholarly attention to Germany; and finally, 
I find his thesis convincing. Historians like to stress how science doesn’t live 
in some empyrean castle of ideal dimensions, but rather on the rough-and-
tumble plain of interest and influence. If we consider Richard’s essay at its 
most sublunary, we could take his analysis of the evolution of Darwin’s ideas 
as a metaphor of how truth emerges from history through the careful selection 
of material from the marketplace of ideas. But instead of focusing on Richard’s 
rhetoric, I’d prefer to look at Darwin’s reception in the country most affected 
by his teachings. German disciples wrangled over the meaning of his theory 
from the outset, something that helps to explain why the debate shows no 
signs of dying down there even today.1
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ii. Final Causes in Darwin’s Theory
“Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection and its Moral Purpose” begins with the 
classic anecdote of Thomas Henry Huxley’s astonishment at the simplicity of the 
principle of natural selection: “How extremely stupid not to have thought of that!” 
Richards maintains that natural selection is neither as simple as Huxley recollected 
nor as mechanical as scholars described. Instead, the principle embodies a complex 
set of ideas that took Darwin years of work to develop into a forceful argument. 
Drawing on evidence from notebooks, manuscript essays, and early drafts of the 
Origin, Richards traces the evolution of Darwin’s thinking from his early beliefs 
in the effects of habit and environment to his analogies of breeding and warfare 
to his crucial reading of Thomas Malthus’s essay on population. Central to this 
development was a teleological conception of “the production of higher animals,” 
which Richards takes to be “human beings with their moral sentiments.”
Richards adduces three sources of evidence for Darwin’s belief in progress. 
The first is “embryological recapitulation,” a phrase that refers to the parallel 
between the stages of growth in an organism and the order of species in 
the natural world. Since both series tend toward greater differentiation and 
complexity, many biologists assumed them to be lawfully related. As Ernst 
Haeckel declared in 1866, “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.”
The second source of evidence is Darwin’s image of a “hand of nature” 
picking and choosing the very best individuals. Much as a wise breeder selects 
superior types for his crosses, nature continually scrutinizes her flocks for 
advantages of form and behavior. The language of Darwin’s metaphor is 
necessarily teleological: machines can’t make choices, but nature can and 
does, and always for the good of the species.
This observation led Darwin into a conundrum. If natural selection implies 
a war of all against all, how do we account for instances of altruism? The 
inheritance of acquired behaviors is hard to imagine in organisms that lack 
cultural memory, and on the biological side of things, no one has been able 
to show how habits turn into instincts. Instead of invoking occult powers of 
learning and inheritance, Darwin attributed selflessness to competition in a 
broader sense—competition between groups. Those that cooperated prevailed 
over those that didn’t. As Richards points out in his third source of evidence, all 
this struggle had a happy outcome. Nature favored the intelligent and the just.
iii. Du Bois-Reymond’s Mechanist Interpretation of Darwin’s 
Theory
The first German scientist to accept Darwin’s teachings was Emil du Bois-
Reymond. Why this fact has escaped attention isn’t entirely clear—it may 
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have something to do with the oblivion into which du Bois-Reymond has 
fallen, and it may have something to do with the indifference with which 
most physiologists greeted Darwin’s theory. Whatever the case, du Bois-
Reymond never hid his respect for his Victorian colleague. He first learned 
of the publication of the Origin in the fall of 1859; he read the second edition 
in English in the spring of 1860; he let his colleagues know that he approved 
of the theory later that year; and by the winter of 1861 he was teaching the 
theory to his students at the University of Berlin. Thereafter he worked to 
get Darwin an honorary degree from the University of Breslau, a knighthood 
of the Prussian Order of Merit, and a membership to the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences. He also promoted Darwin in public lectures and in formal addresses, 
most notably a eulogy in 1883 that sparked two days of debate in the Prussian 
House of Deputies. Given his authority as the “foremost naturalist of Europe,” 
and given his talent as a spokesman for evolutionary theory, du Bois-Reymond 
vied with Haeckel for the title of Darwin’s champion in Germany.2
The interesting thing about du Bois-Reymond’s example is that he endorsed 
Darwin for reasons entirely at odds with the ones that Richards defends. In 
his youth du Bois-Reymond read Lucretius, ridiculed teleology, and swore 
to uphold the tenets of biological reduction. He considered Alexander von 
Humboldt’s Romantic natural history “antediluvian both in mind and matter,” 
just as he faulted his advisor, the biologist Johannes Müller, for dabbling in 
the theories of Goethe. By contrast, Darwin presented du Bois-Reymond with 
a vision of nature “permeated by one glorious and undeviating principle of 
regularity”—the principle of mechanical necessity.3
Du Bois-Reymond’s commitment to mechanism ran through all his 
discussions of Darwin. It could be found in his survey of the “Findings of 
Contemporary Science,” a popular course first offered in the winter of 1861 that 
highlighted energy conservation and natural selection as foundations of the 
natural order. Du Bois-Reymond concluded his treatment of Darwin with the 
praise that natural selection had eliminated “at one stroke all justification for 
the suspenseful agony of teleology.” The same judgment informed another 
popular “Exposition of the Darwinian Theory” that he delivered nine times 
between 1877 and 1880. Du Bois-Reymond ended these presentations with a 
simple question: Which was more dignified of God—successive periods of creation, 
lumps of protoplasm invested with special powers, or a primordial cosmic nebula? 
The last possibility, he reminded his listeners, had the advantage of positing an 
entirely mechanical basis to evolution. But the most complete statement of du 
Bois-Reymond’s views on evolution appeared in “Darwin versus Galiani,” a speech 
that one contemporary called “the clearest defense of natural selection.”4
Addressed to the Prussian Academy of Sciences on July 6, 1876 in celebration 
of its founder, “Darwin versus Galiani” drew explicit lines of continuity 
between the mechanical character of Leibniz’s physics and the mechanical 
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character of Darwin’s biology. Du Bois-Reymond set the stage by recounting 
a classic debate over design in nature. The radical materialist Baron Holbach 
maintained that life arose fortuitously, in opposition to the Abbé Galiani, 
who dismissed Holbach’s conjecture as entirely improbable. This dispute 
expressed the quandary of natural history in the Age of Enlightenment: 
either it surrendered “all occurrences to the hand of Epicurean chance” or 
it granted a providential order to the universe. Darwin’s great service was to 
have supplied it with a third alternative, that “of establishing blind necessity 
in the place of final causes.” Du Bois-Reymond judged the eminence of the 
achievement plain. Eradicating teleology from nature constituted “one of the 
greatest advances ever made in the world of thought.”5
Other scholars agreed. The author of a history of materialism rejected final 
causes as antiquated:
Most of those who, in spite of modern science, feel themselves justified 
in holding fast to teleology, cling to the gaps in scientific knowledge, 
overlooking the fact that at all events the form of teleology which has 
existed until now, that is, the anthropomorphic, is utterly disposed of 
by the facts. . . . It can now, however, be no longer doubted that nature 
proceeds in a way which has no similarity with human purposefulness; 
nay, that her most essential means is such that, measured by the standard 
of human understanding, it can only be compared with the blindest 
chance. On this point we need wait for no future proof; the facts speak 
so plainly and in the most various provinces of nature so unanimously, 
that no view of things is henceforth admissible which contradicts these 
facts and their necessary meaning.6
Du Bois-Reymond equally identified the concepts of force and matter as 
nothing other than a “more recondite product of the irresistible tendency to 
personification.”7 Such animism was disastrous for science. “Final causes in 
nature are incompatible with its intelligibility,” he explained.
Hence, if there is any way of banishing teleology from nature, the scientist 
has to take it. Such a way is found in the theory of natural selection .  . . .  
In holding fast to this theory, we may feel like a man clinging to a plank 
that only barely keeps him afloat. When the choice lies between a plank 
and going under, the advantage is decidedly on the side of the plank.8
His allusion to Lucretius was clear: The Origin of Species may have been a 
shipwreck, but it was better than the alternative.
For the remainder of the speech du Bois-Reymond compared the views of 
Leibniz and Darwin. A perfect universe had no need for final causes. Modern 
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perspectives looked much the same. “Take away from Leibniz’s theory of the 
cosmos the illusory apparatus of monadology, of pre-established harmony, 
and of optimism,” du Bois-Reymond remarked, “and the only solid core that 
remains is the mechanical conception of the world.” The implications of this 
outlook were clear:
How profoundly in error are they who, often in tones of scientific 
pharisaism, lament our blindness in trying to account for the world 
without final causes. . . . These people simply show that they are 
fundamentally ignorant of what discovery means.
True understanding was physics; as far as biology was concerned, Darwin’s 
theory offered the closest approximation.9
iv. Conclusion
Richards is right—natural selection isn’t easy to understand. What are we to 
make, then, of du Bois-Reymond’s immediate grasp of the concept? Did he 
attach a meaning to it that Darwin never intended, or was he just the first of 
his colleagues to perceive its significance? Does natural selection superintend 
a grand design, or does it simply hammer order out of chaos? Scholars debated 
the question in Darwin’s time, just as they do now.
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